The Hyper-Personalization of War
Cyber, Big Data, and the Changing Face of Conflict
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.
“You may not be interested in war, but war is interested in you.”
Leon Trotsky
For those who participate in it, all war can seem “hyper-personalized.” But advances in cyber technology have enabled
personalization to literally be taken to a whole new level, and
this capability may make the role of cyber in future conflicts
rather different than what is conceived today.
Popular conceptions of “cyber war” conjure up apocalyptic visions of aircraft crashing into each other due to disabled
air traffic control systems, entire cities darkened as result of
a computer breakdowns, and even nuclear plants melting
down because of misdirected computerized instructions.
These are the kind of incidents former Secretary of Defense
Leon Panetta warned about in 2012 speech. According to
Panetta, he feared a “cyber Pearl Harbor” that “would paralyze and shock the nation and create a new, profound sense
of vulnerability. Likewise, President Obama characterized
the cyber threat as “one of the most serious economic and
national security challenges we face as a nation.”1
Yet, increasing numbers of scholars are questioning that
premise. In 2012, Professor Thomas Rid argued in an arti[ 1 08 ] Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
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cle entitled “Cyber War Will Not Take
Place” that cyberwar has never happened, is not happening, and is “highly
unlikely” to occur in the future.2 Similarly, researchers Jerry Brito and Tate
Watkins contended in 2012 that the
evidence of an imminent cyber catastrophe is scant. While conceding that
“cyberattacks and cyberespionage are
real and serious concerns,” that statement “is not evidence that we face a
grave risk of national catastrophe.”3
More recently, authors Bill Blunden
and Violet Cheung claim in their new
book, Behold a Pale Farce: Cyber War, Threat
Inflation, and That Malware Industrial Complex,
that the cyber threat has been overhyped
for the purpose, they say, of making
the public “so apprehensive and uneasy
[about the cyber threat] they’ll accept
any solution to feel safe again.”4
Less histrionically, the New York
Times reports that prior to operations
in Libya in 2010, the United States
considered employing cyber methodologies against Gadhafi’s military, but
ultimately rejected it in part due to the
sheer difficulty in doing so. The Times
observed that although “popular fiction
and films depict cyberattacks as easy to
mount…in reality it takes significant
digital snooping to identify potential
entry points and susceptible nodes.”
Even then, writing and inserting the
“proper poisonous codes” is challenging.5
This article suggests that our understanding of the potential permutations of cyber war may be incomplete.
Assuming that cyber means will inexorably impact the characteristics of war in
the 21st century, it argues that the growing capabilities of cyber methodologies
may find a different application in

armed conflict than popularly assumed.
In particular, “Big Data” technologies
mainly intended for commercial uses
enable not only the acquisition and
archiving of vast amounts of data, but
also empower a radically enhanced ability for rapid analysis. The convergence
of these technologies will permit what
might be called “the hyper-personalization of war.”

The Technological Environment. 21st century conflicts will take

place in an environment defined by
enormous advances in information
technologies. Though most realize that
the number of people active in cyberspace has grown considerably, the actual
figures can still be surprising.
For example, since the year 2000,
the number of Internet users has grown
566%.6 Significantly, this growth is
not just in the developed world. The
International Telecommunications
Union (ITU) reports that by “the end
of 2014, there will be almost 3 billion
Internet users, with two-thirds of them
coming from the developing world.”
Furthermore, ITU says “the number of
mobile-broadband subscriptions will
reach 2.3 billion globally,” adding, “[f]
ifty-five percent of these subscriptions
are expected to be in the developing
world.”7
Equally important is the enormous
amount of data available in cyberspace.
In a 2012 estimate, “90% of the world’s
data was created in the last two years
alone.”8 In fact, 2.5 quintillion bytes of
data is created each day, which is “more
data than was seen by everyone since the
beginning of time.”9 Facebook users
alone upload over 350 million images
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per day.10 As those millions of images
indicate, there is a huge amount of
personal information accessible online.
The loosely defined term for today’s
massive data sets is “Big Data.”11 Because
of its potential to revolutionize how
goods are sold, it is almost impossible to overstate the impact of the rise
of “Big Data” on global commerce.
Recognizing “Big Data’s” potential to
personalize marketing efforts to a truly
unprecedented degree, businesses of all
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and social trending.”14 In other words,
commercial entities can identify individuals or groups of individuals based
on their behavior patterns gleaned
from data in cyberspace.

The Weaponization of “Big
Data”. Historically, developments in

commerce and industry tend to make
their way into the conduct of war. The
availability of “Big Data” and the tools
to analyze it present a real opportu-

It appears that in the not-too-distant future, the
U.S. military will be able to launch swarms of drones
of drones equipped with facial recognition software...
types are clamoring for a way to utilize
it, and companies are responding. In
the January 2014 issue of the New York
Review of Books, Alice Marwick reports an
entire “database marketing” industry
has arisen that is devoted to “collecting,
aggregating, and brokering personal
data.”12 Marwick describes a firm that:
[C]reates profiles, or digital dossiers, about millions of people, based
on the 1,500 points of data about
them it claims to have. These data
might include your education level;
how many children you have; the type
of car you drive; your stock portfolio; your recent purchases; and your
race, age, and education level.
Such digital dossiers are sold to
retailers who use the information to
“hyper-personalize” their marketing
efforts to specific consumers.13 Some
companies have used the “phenomenon
of hyper-personalization” to categorize
“users into neatly defined clusters based
on their search history, buying behavior
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nity for governments to use “off-theshelf technologies” to enhance their war
fighting ability.
One obvious opportunity is to build
databases of potential opponents’ militaries that could be so detailed as to
include electronic dossiers of individual members. The capability may already
exist: according to press reports, the
NSA collects millions of facial images
each day for use in a sophisticated facial
recognition program.15 Consider the
recent allegation that Chinese hackers stole thousands of personnel files
on U.S. government workers.16 Such
information together with other data
and technologies could be exploited
during conflicts to personalize the
means and methods of warfare to a
wholly new degree.
It is critical to understand that cyberderived data does not sit in isolation
from other developing technologies.
One technology that achieved significant prominence in recent years is the
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use of remotely-piloted aircraft commonly known as “drones” to engage in
long-term surveillance of battlefields
in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere,
and to attack enemy fighters wherever
found. Militaries around the world see
the potential of these aircraft, and over
the next decade spending on drones
could top $89 billion worldwide.17
While issues exist regarding the current generation of drones’ survivability
against sophisticated opponents, there
will no doubt be further improvements
that could permit them to operate in
contested air environments. Furthermore, published reports reveal that the
U.S. military is developing a generation
of small drones capable of operating
in networked groups, or “swarms.”18
Other reports suggest efforts to develop lethal micro-drones that “resemble winged, multi-legged bugs” which
“swarm through alleys, crawl across
windowsills, and perch on power lines”
as they seek their target.19
Parallel to the rapid development of
drone technology is the swift advance
of facial recognition software.20 The
linkage of the two in the context of “Big
Data” was virtually inevitable. In 2013
the Associated Press, in a story provocatively entitled, “Drones With Facial
Recognition Technology Will End Anonymity, Everywhere,” explained that
given the growing ubiquity of drones
linked to massive databases:
[C]yber experts believe it’s only a
matter of years — and research dollars — until computers can identify
almost anyone instantly. Computers then could use electronic data to
immediately construct an intimate
dossier about the person, much of
it from available information online

that many people put out there
themselves.
The military sees the potential of
these capabilities. Popular Science reports
the U.S. Army is developing drones
that can recognize people at a distance
and in crowds.21 The Army is also seeking to develop a “system [that] would
integrate data from informants’ tips,
drone footage, and captured phone
calls” so “a human behavior modeling and simulation engine” could spit
out “intent-based threat assessments of
individuals and groups.”22

Warfighting Implications. What

does this “cocktail” of cyber technologies mean for warfighting? Quite
simply, it appears that in the not-toodistant future, the U.S. military - and
likely other militaries - will be able to
launch swarms of drones equipped with
facial recognition software to roam battlefields looking for very specific members of an enemy’s force. These could
be officers, but also selected technicians
and battle-hardened leaders who possess vital and difficult-to-replace skills.
Of course, militaries have long
sought to ‘decapitate’ their enemies’
forces. During the Revolutionary War,
General Daniel Morgan, the commander of Morgan’s Rifles (an elite
group of sharpshooters) employed a
“hyper-personalization” methodology
that some considered “dishonorable.”23
Morgan and his unit “would hide and
target British officers and Indian guides
that the British sent out to scout out
the land.”24 Although controversial, “it
was effective” as it “would often send
the British Army into chaos.”25 Sending an army into chaos though hyperpersonalized attack is a valued capability

International Engagement on Cyber IV [ 1 1 1 ]

DUNLAP

in any era.
Drones are widely used today, but
what is contemplated here is swarms of
drones – hundreds, if not thousands.
This would be a substantially more
robust operation than the relatively
modest, ongoing but limited effort to
use drones to attack “senior operational
terrorist leaders.”26 Nevertheless, it is
instructive that the publicly available
documents obtained from Osama bin
Laden’s compound during the raid that
killed him express much concern about
the damage done by drones. As one
official put it, correspondence from
an Al Qaeda field commander complained “that their guys were getting
killed [by drones] faster than they could
be replaced.”27
What makes hyper-personalized war
potentially so effective is not simply
its ability to cripple military force by
eliminating key personnel, but the psychological effect it could have on the force
as a whole. One of the things that sustains soldiers in the crucible of combat
is their relationship with others in their
unit. This bonding process – the proverbial “band of brothers” – provides a
shield against the psychological isolation of the battlefield. Otherwise, the
extreme stress of combat can morph
into fear, then panic, and even flight.
Hyper-personalized war alters this
calculation by overtly targeting particular individuals; it makes it very clear
that certain unit members – primarily
the leadership cadre but also critical
technicians and experts – are much
more at risk than others. To some
extent this is always been the case in war;
however, the convergence of technologies in the 21st century accentuates and
facilitates it in an unprecedented way.
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Furthermore, history shows that certain weapons have tapped into primal
human instincts in a way that conjures up a dislocating fear that is out
of proportion to their actual effect.
For example, the taboo regarding gas
weapons seems to have originated in
the “innate human aversion to poisonous substances.”28 Similarly, it might
be said the hyper-personalization of
war taps into the primal fear of being
hunted.29 This adds to the psychological
disorientation that hyper-personalized
war can inflict on modern armies.
Hyper-personalization of war also
removes one of the chief “palliative
techniques” that soldiers use to deal
with combat stress: denial.30 Essentially, the individual appreciates the
danger of the situation but still believes
that although others around him may
become casualties, “the worst will never
happen to [them]” personally.31 Obviously, when an adversary has the ability
to personalize the threat – and perhaps even communicate it directly –
that fragile coping mechanism becomes
inadequate.
The notion of wide scale - yet personal - contact with individuals of an
opposing force is not without precedent. In fact, an early version of the
hyper-personalization of war occurred
before the start of the war against Iraq
in 2003. U.S. forces dispatched thousands of personal e-mails to “Iraqi
military officers warning them to abandon their positions and vehicles so not
to suffer harm.”32
Another opportunity to create psychological damage on an opponent’s
force was suggested in a 2001 article by
Christopher C. Joyner and Catherine
Lotrionte. They pointed out how ter-
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rorists and criminals could:
“[D]ivert finds from bank computers
and corrupt data in databases, causing disruption or panic” and “steal
and disclose confidential personal,
medical or financial information,
as a tool of blackmail and extortion,
and cause widespread social disruption or embarrassment.”33
Today’s “Big Data” capabilities would
allow these examples to be converted
into a means and method of warfare to
be used not just by groups of terrorists and criminals, but also by armies
in an effort to distract enemy troops
from their war fighting focus. Such an
operation could include, for example,
widespread hacking of various cyberspace accounts of individual deployed
soldiers and their families.
Knowing that an adversary could
focus their efforts in such a personalized way could itself inflict psychological trauma.34 Daniel Ventre records

lims achieved this effect by hacking
email accounts, and by “intercepting
cell phone calls between soldiers in
Afghanistan and their families.” It certainly seems possible that today a belligerent, and particularly one with state
resources, could replicate this type of
cyber-enabled – yet hyper-personalized
- exploitation on a much wider scale.

Legal and Policy Implications.
Does the hyper-personalization of
war offend legal or ethical regimes?
The short answer seems to be, generally, “no”. Developing a means to
focus an attack on individual members of an enemy force is not unlawful; it is not, for example, an illegal form of assassination as many
seem to believe.36 In his 1989 U.S.
Department of Defense memorandum about Executive Order 12333
(a Presidential directive about policies concerning intelligence activi-

What makes hyper-personalized war potentially so effective is not simply its ability to cripple
military force by eliminating key personnel, but the
psychological effect it could have on the force as a
whole.
a 2007 incident in Denmark where
“opponents of Western armed forces in
their interventions” identified this vulnerability. He explained that Muslim
extremists had “tried to intimidate families of Danish soldiers in Afghanistan”
by contacting them directly. According
to Ventre, this event “triggered a strong
worry amongst the Danish.”35
Ventre relates that the Mus-

ties, including assassination) Hays
Parks, one of the nation’s foremost
experts on the law of armed conflict,
detailed why killing individual enemy combatants in war is not “assassination” as understood in common
parlance.37
Parks draws a sharp distinction
between peacetime and wartime killings. “Peacetime assassination,” he
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says, “would seem to encompass the
murder of a private individual or
public figure for political purposes”
something international law prohibits irrespective of an Executive

Military Matters

vidualized attack on the same basis as
members of traditional, uniformed
militaries, as long as they perform a
“continuous combat function.”41
Of course, international law pro-

Hacking a civilian’s e-mail system during armed
conflict to direct a propaganda e-mail personally to
him or her does not violate the law of war…
Order.38 However, the killing of
combatants in war is a very different
matter. Parks points out that as a
matter of international law “the role
of the military [in wartime] includes
legalized killing” and that combatants “are liable to attack at any time
or place.”39
An individual combatant’s “vulnerability to lawful targeting,” Parks
observes, “is not dependent upon his
or her ‘military duties, or proximity
to combat as such’.”40 Furthermore,
any lawful weapon or technique can
be used. Parks cites a number of historical examples, including the 1943
downing of a Japanese aircraft carrying Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku.
Accordingly, a cyber-empowered
technique that permits hyper-personalization of war could be lawfully
employed against individual belligerents.
Furthermore, the consensus
among international lawyers is that
non-state actors in a bona fide
armed conflict who organize themselves into armed groups engaged
in continuous combat operations
against other similar armed groups
or nation-states are subject to indi-
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hibits making targets of civilians not
directly involved in hostilities. Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions
calls upon the parties to distinguish
“between the civilian population
and combatants in between civilian
objects and military objectives.”42
Protocol 1 further directs the parties
to a conflict “shall direct operations
only against military objectives.”43
Consequently, civilians “enjoy
general protection against dangers
arising from military operations.”44
Additionally, international law provides that “acts or threats of violence
the primary purpose of which is to
spread terror among civilian population are prohibited.” However,
this prohibition does not exempt
civilians from all consequences of
war.
For example, international law
only considers “attacks” as cyber
operations that are “violent“ - that
is, designed to cause death, injury
or significant damage.45 A cyberoperation that is purely psychological in
nature – such as propaganda - may
‘target’ civilians so long as it does
not aim to “incite the population to
commit crimes.”46
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Along these lines, hacking a civilian’s e-mail system during armed
conflict to direct a propaganda
e-mail personally to him or her does
not violate the law of war (although it
may violate domestic law).47 Even if a
personalized email threatens to target a son or daughter who is serving
in the armed forces unless the family
fails to take steps to actively oppose
the war, it is unlikely that such action
would violate international law. It
is permissible to attack or threaten
to attack a bona fide combatant as,
presumably, the actively deployed
military family member would be.
In contrast, an email that threatened an action violating the law of
war would indeed violate international law. For example, it would be
unlawful to threaten to kill or kidnap
a civilian family member not directly
participating in hostilities. Furthermore, international law prohibits targeting a civilian object not
being used for military purposes.48
This would mean that a cyber
“operation” (as the term is used in
Protocol 1) designed to hack into
a civilian’s personal bank account
or medical records (as Joyner’s
and Lotrionte’ article hypothesizes
criminals or terrorists might do)
would be illegal under international
law. Indeed, targeting the personal
property of a combatant is likewise
typically a breach of the law because
it is not necessarily part of a proper
military objective.
Conclusion. The emergence of
cyber-enabled “hyper-personalized”
war raises a variety of issues for 21st
century democracies. For instance,

what effect will it have on military
recruitment and retention, particularly in the growing number of
countries like the US that rely on
all-volunteer militaries? Adversaries’ abilities to literally “reach out
and touch” particular individuals
could adversely affect the mindsets
of individuals who otherwise would
be disposed to serve in the military,
as well as “influencers” of military
service, such as parents, spouses, and
friends.49
Moreover, there are a nearly endless number of scenarios where
adversaries could hyper-personalize
conflict via cyber means. Enemy
agents could track the online habits, school schedules, and other
activities of servicemembers’ children and employ data-mining and
other cyber-techniques to pinpoint
them. This information could then
be used to plot all kinds of actual
malevolence against their children,
or to simply craft very precise threats
toward their families. In either case,
enormous anxiety would be generated among the troops about the safety
of their loved ones. It would make
it almost impossible for soldiers to
focus on warfighting duties.
This scenario also shows that the
hyper-personalization of war, particularly through the exploitation
of open-source information, may
disadvantage democracies and other open societies simply because it
would be easier to build the database
of targets. While it is probable that
even the relatively few remaining
truly closed societies (like North
Korea) will eventually be obliged to
provide their peoples with access to
International Engagement on Cyber IV [ 1 1 5]
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the Internet, it is readily conceivable
that freer societies where individuals
are almost fully unconstrained about
the sharing of personal information
would obviously be more vulnerable.
Another dark side of the hyperpersonalization of war is that the
cyber technologies that enable it are
not especially unique to the United
States or other advanced democracies. In most instances, they are
available on the commercial market.
In the hands of the totalitarian or
repressive regimes - something that
is virtually inevitable – these capabilities would facilitate the identification and elimination of dissidents.
At the same time, combatants
waging hyper-personalized war who
also observe the law could aid in
shielding innocents from the consequences of conflict. Not only might
the application of force be limited to
bona fide belligerents, even within
that group only a select few might
need to be targeted. Narrowing the
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number of combatants at risk, and
limiting (or even eliminating) many
of the dangers to civilians might
ameliorate some of the horror of
war. Recently, the Israelis illustrated another risk-limiting hyperpersonalization technique when they
called the personal cell phones of
Gaza civilians to warn them that the
building they were occupying was
about to be bombed.50
Finally, it cannot be over-emphasized that hyper-personalized war
is not necessarily the only, or even
most likely, form of “cyberwar” that
we could see in the 21st century.
Still, acknowledging and preparing
for the inventive application of cyber
capabilities occasioned by the rise
of “Big Data” and all that comes
with it is vital. Absent doing so,
we may find ourselves suffering not
the “cyber Pearl Harbor” that Mr.
Panetta fears, but another one with
consequences equally as serious consequences.
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